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First	draft	of:		Hamid	 Taieb,	 “Brentano	 on	 Properties	 and	 Relations”,	 in	 Uriah	 Kriegel	 (ed.),	
Routledge	Handbook	of	Franz	Brentano	and	the	Brentano	School,	 Routledge,	 London	2017.	Please	quote	from	the	published	version.		 	
Brentano	on	Properties	and	Relations	Hamid	Taieb1			Brentano	 wrote	 his	 doctoral	 dissertation	 on	 Aristotle’s	 ontology	 (Brentano	1862/1975a).	However,	 the	 books	 and	 articles	 that	Brentano	published	during	his	lifetime	 do	 not	 contain	much	 information	 about	 his	 own	 theory	 of	 properties	 and	relations.	His	main	texts	on	this	topic	can	be	found	in	the	posthumous	volumes	The	
True	 and	 the	 Evident	 (Brentano	 1930/1966b),	 The	 Theory	 of	 Categories	(1933/1981a),	 and	 The	Renunciation	of	 the	Unreal	 (1966a),	 which	 mainly	 contain	documents	 from	 after	 his	 reistic	 turn	 of	 1904	 (on	 reism,	 see	 Chap.	 16).	 The	manuscripts	 “About	 the	 Theory	 of	 Categories”	 (Brentano	 1992–1993),	 “On	Substance”	(1993),	and	“Abstraction	and	Relation”	(2013a/c),	all	from	approximately	1900,	 are	Brentano’s	most	 important	published	pre-reistic	 texts	 on	properties	 and	relations.	Some	 information	 is	also	present	 in	Brentano’s	 logic	 lectures,	given	 from	1869–1870	until	1877	in	Würzburg	and	Vienna	(Brentano	2011).2	Much	information	on	 the	 young	 Brentano’s	 theory	 of	 properties	 and	 relations	 can	 be	 found	 in	 the	metaphysics	 lectures	given	 in	Würzburg	 from	1867	onwards	(ms.	M	96),	but	 these	lectures	are	unpublished.		In	 this	 chapter,	 I	 will	 focus	 on	 Brentano’s	 theory	 of	 properties	 and	 relations	 as	established	during	his	mature	period,	 from	Psychology	from	an	Empirical	Standpoint	onwards,	published	in	1874,	until	his	death,	in	1917,	and	indicate	the	most	important	changes	that	his	reistic	turn	entailed	for	his	theory	of	properties	and	relations.3	First,	I	discuss	the	ontological	features	common	to	properties	and	relations.	Second,	I	deal	with	relations	in	particular.		
																																																								1	I	thank	Nicole	Osborne	for	having	checked	my	English.	2	For	the	dating	of	these	lectures,	see	Rollinger	2011.	3	I	 will	 briefly	 outline	 the	 young	 Brentano’s	 theory	 of	 properties	 and	 relations	 in	 the	footnotes.	 For	 the	 recognition	 of	 three	 periods	 in	 Brentano’s	 ontology,	 namely	“conceptualism”	(1862–1874),	“ontology	of	intentionality”	(1874–1904),	and	“reism”	(1904–1917),	see	Chrudzimski	2004,	Chrudzimski,	Smith	2004.		
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I.	Ontological	features	common	to	properties	and	relations		Abstract	names,	for	Brentano,	designate	either	“metaphysical	parts”	or	“logical	parts”	(Brentano	 2011:	 86).	 “Metaphysical	 parts”	 are	 particular	 properties	 and	 relations,	either	essential	or	accidental,	of	a	given	concrete	particular	or	“metaphysical	whole”.	“Logical	parts”	are	the	“general	marks”	composing	the	definition,	or	“logical	whole”,	of	an	individual	of	a	given	genus.	Thus,	“redness”	can	either	designate	the	particular	redness	of	a	given	red	thing	or	the	species	‘redness’	composing	the	definition	of	this	particular	redness.4			Metaphysical	wholes	and	parts,	or	concrete	and	abstract	particulars,	are	correlatives:	a	 red	 thing	 is	 red	 through	 redness,	 and	 redness	 is	 the	 redness	 of	 a	 red	 thing	(Brentano	 2013a/c:	 466–467/439–440).	 Both	 concrete	 and	 abstract	 particulars	exist.	 However,	 they	 do	 not	 have	 the	 same	 ontological	 status.	 Concrete	 particulars	are	“real”,	whereas	abstract	particulars	are	“unreal”	(not	to	be	confused	with	“non-existent”)	 (Brentano	 2013a/c:	 472/438).	 The	 distinction	 between	 realia—real	beings,	also	called	“subsistent”	(wesenhaft)—and	irrealia—unreal	beings,	also	called	“non-subsistent”	(unwesenhaft)—is	based	on	causality:		There	is	being	that	begins	without	itself	being	caused,	[but	the	beginning	of	which]	is	simply	due	to	the	fact	that	something	else	is	caused.	Likewise	it	ceases	to	be	without	itself	undergoing	a	destructive	influence	or	being	deprived	of	a	sustaining	influence.	It	begins,	persists,	 and	ceases	 to	be	en	parergo,	 so	 to	 speak.	 [...]	 Such	being	we	call	“non-subsistent”.	 Something	 subsistent,	 by	 contrast,	 is	 that	which	 as	 such	 can	 and	does	causally	bring	something	about,	and	which	as	such	cannot	begin	without	being	causally	brought	about	and	cannot	as	such	cease	to	be	without	as	such	undergoing	a	[destructive]	influence	or	removal	of	a	sustaining	influence.	(Brentano	2013a/c:	466-–467/432–433,	translation	slightly	modified)		Thus,	 concrete	 particulars	 are	 causally	 efficacious	 and	 sensible	 and	 have	 a	 proper	generation	 and	 corruption,	 whereas	 abstract	 particulars,	 as	 Chrudzimski	 says,	 are	not,	as	such,	“integrated	into	the	causal	network	of	the	world”.	Yet	both	concrete	and	abstract	particulars	exist	(see	Chrudzimski	2004:	138–141	for	a	detailed	analysis	of	these	passages	from	Brentano	2013a).		According	to	Chrudzimski	and	Smith,	Brentano	is	a	trope	theorist,	i.e.	he	only	admits	abstract	 particulars	 in	 his	 ontology,	 not	 abstract	 universals.	 In	 other	words,	 of	 the	two	kinds	of	parts	that	abstract	names	designate,	namely	“metaphysical”	and	“logical																																																									4	The	most	detailed	discussion	of	the	notions	of	metaphysical	and	logical	parts	is	not	found	in	Brentano	 2011,	 but	 in	 Brentano’s	 Würzburgian	 metaphysics	 lectures,	 presented	 in	Baumgartner,	 Simons	 1992–1993:	 60–62,	 Chrudzimski	 2004:	 95–110,	 Chrudzimski,	 Smith	2004:	202–204,	and	Baumgartner	2013:	232–236,	which	I	follow	here.	
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parts”,	 only	 the	 first	 one	 would	 find	 a	 place	 in	 Brentano’s	 ontology	 (Chrudzimski	2004,	Chrudzimski,	Smith	2004).	It	is	true	that	Brentano	is	not	a	friend	of	universals.	He	 rejects	 both	 “Platonic”,	 or	 “transcendent”,	 and	 “Aristotelian”,	 or	 “immanent”,	realism	of	universals:	general	entities	exist	neither	in	a	“world	of	Ideas”	nor	in	things	themselves.5	Thus,	 certainly	 the	 only	abstracta	that	 Brentano	wants	to	admit	 in	 his	ontology	 are	 abstract	 particulars.	 However,	 as	 I	 shall	 show,	 the	 reader,	 in	 view	 of	some	specific	texts,	could	have	worries	about	Brentano’s	theory	of	individuation	and	think	that	some	of	his	properties	and	relations	are	disguised	universals.6		Contemporary	 philosophers	 think	 that	 tropes	 must	 be	 simple,	 i.e.	 that	 their	qualitative	and	individuating	features	should	not	be	ontologically	distinct.	Indeed,	if	tropes	 were	 entities	 with	 two	 distinct	 “ontological	 grounds”,	 providing	 them	with	quality	 and	 individuality	 respectively,	 they	 would	 become	 complex	 entities	constituted	by	a	universal	and	a	“substrate”	or	individuator:	the	individuator	would	be	 extrinsic	 to	 the	 quality,	 which,	 thus,	 would	 be	 a	 universal,	 and	 the	 particular	would	 be	 the	 complex	 entity	 made	 of	 the	 universal	 and	 the	 individuator	 (Maurin	2002:	11–21;	see	also	Campbell	1990:	56–57).	As	Moreland	(2001:	59)	writes:		The	trope	view	must	assay	a	basic	trope	as	a	simple	in	order	to	avoid	assigning	the	individuating	 and	 qualitative	 roles	 to	 non-identical	 constituents	 in	 the	 quality-instance,	 for	 this	 is	 what	 realists	 do	 (e.g.	 red1	 has	 an	 individuator,	 say,	 a	 bare	particular	expressed	by	1,	the	universal	redness,	and	a	tie	of	predication).		For	 example,	 someone	 who	 thinks	 that	 tropes	 are	 individuated	 through	 their	“spatiotemporal	position”	does	not	mean	“that	place	and	the	quality	present	at	that	place	 are	distinct	 beings,	 one	 the	particularizer	 and	 the	other	 a	universal,	 but	 that	‘quality-at-a-place’	is	itself	a	single,	particular,	reality”	(Campbell	1981:	483;	see	also	Moreland	2001:	54,	Maurin	2002:	18).			What	about	Brentano?	According	to	him,	accidents	are	individuated	by	the	substance	of	 the	 concrete	 particular	 of	which	 they	 are	 the	 parts	 (Brentano	 1992–1993:	 263,	267–268,	1993:	30–34).	 For	physical	 accidents,	 this	 substance	 is	 the	body,	 and	 for	psychic	accidents	it	is	the	self:																																																										5	See	 notably	 Brentano	 2011:	 34,	 38–39,	 1930/1966b:	 74/43.	 For	 the	 distinction	 between	“Platonic”	and	“Aristotelian”	 realism	of	universals,	 see	Armstrong	1978.	One	could	wonder	whether	“Aristotelian	realism”	was	actually	defended	by	Aristotle.	At	any	rate,	Brentano	was	not	attributing	immanent	realism	to	Aristotle,	but	to	William	of	Champeaux,	a	philosopher	of	the	12th	century	(see	notably	Brentano	1966a:	317).	On	immanent	realism	in	the	history	of	philosophy,	see	Erismann	2011.	6	Chrudzimski	2004:	140	n.	 133	evokes	 such	an	hypothesis	 on	 the	basis	 of	Brentano	2013	a/c:	472/438,	but	 finally	 rejects	 it,	 and	maintains	 that	Brentano’s	properties	 and	 relations	are	tropes.	In	my	opinion,	the	“disguised	universals”	hypothesis	is	rooted	in,	and	confirmed	by	Brentano	1992–1993	and	1993.	
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Specifically	 similar	 acts	 are	 individually	 distinct	 when	 they	 are	 mine	 or	 someone	else’s.	The	individualizer	is	the	subject.	(Brentano	1993:	33;	my	translation)		Thus,	 Brentano’s	 particular	 accidents	 have	 ontologically-distinct	 qualitative	 and	individuating	grounds.	Regarding	the	body,	it	is	a	combination	of	a	series	of	abstract	qualitative	 properties	 and	 an	 abstract	 spatial	 localization	 property	 (see	 Brentano	1992–1993:	 259–264,	 1993:	 30,	 34	 and	 Chrudzimski	 2004:	 145–146).	 The	 body’s	qualitative	 properties	 and	 its	 spatial	 localization	 property	 mutually	 individuate	themselves.	More	 precisely:	 two	 things	 “of	 such	 quality”	 are	 individuated	 by	 their	simultaneous	differences	of	localization,	whereas	two	things	successively	“at	such	a	place”	 are	 individuated	 by	 their	 qualitative	 differences	 (Brentano	 1993:	 259–261,	2013a/c:	471–472/437–438;	see	also	the	later	Brentano	1911c:	59	n.	1).	Again,	there	is	a	distinction	between	the	properties	of	the	body	and	their	individuators,	which	are	also	properties.	Yet	this	distinction	is	probably	only	conceptual.	Indeed,	according	to	Brentano,	 although	 the	 colour	 and	 the	 spatial	 localization	 of	 a	 given	 spot	 in	 the	perceptual	field	fall	under	distinct	“genus”	or	concepts,	they	“penetrate	one	another”	ontologically	(Brentano	1982/1995b:	14–20/17–22	and	Chap.	17).	Generalizing	this	thesis,	 one	 could	 say	 that,	 for	 Brentano,	 the	 body’s	 qualitative	 properties	 and	 its	spatial	 localization	are	only	conceptually	distinct,	 i.e.	 that	bodies	are	constituted	by	simple	 “qualities-at-a-place”,	 or	 simple	 “qualified-spatial-localizations”.	 Regarding	the	self,	Brentano,	 in	his	Psychology,	 says	 that	 it	 is	a	 “unified	whole”	constituted	by	mental	 acts,	 which	 are	 abstract	 entities	 (Brentano	 1874/1973a:	 b.	 II,	 Ch.	 IV	 and	Mulligan	 2004:	 86–88).	 Later,	 he	 affirms	 that	 the	 self	 is	 a	 “part”	 of	 consciousness,	more	 precisely	 a	 “metaphysical	 part”,	 i.e.	 apparently	 an	 abstract	 entity.	 The	 self	seems	 to	be	 simple	 (i.e.	without	ontologically-distinct	qualitative	and	 individuation	grounds)	 and	 primitively	 individuated	 (see	 Brentano	 1993:	 35,	 and	 Chap.	 15;	 on	primitive	individuation	of	tropes,	see	Maurin	2014).	Thus,	the	body’s	properties	and	the	 self,	 for	Brentano,	 seem	 to	be	 genuine	 tropes,	whereas	his	particular	 accidents	have	 ontologically-distinct	 qualitative	 and	 individuation	 grounds,	 and	 resemble	complex	 entities	 constituted	 by	 a	 universal	 and	 an	 individuator.	 Apparently,	Brentano	 and	his	pupils	 saw	 the	problem.	During	his	 reistic	 period,	Brentano	 says	that	one	would	be	wrong	to	think	that:		many	 individual	 things	 correspond	 [to	 a	 general	 concept],	 but	 such	 that	 they	 are	parts	 of	 another	 individual	 thing	 and	 receive	 their	 individuation	 from	 outside	through	their	connection	with	this	thing	and	its	other	parts.	(Brentano	1933/1981a:	60–61/52–53,	unfaithful	to	ms.	M	70,	n°30837;	translation	modified	on	the	basis	of	the	manuscript7)																																																										7	As	 I	 learned	 from	 Guillaume	 Fréchette	 (directly)	 and	 Robin	 Rollinger	 (indirectly),	 Kastil	took	 some	 liberties	 in	 editing	Brentano	1933.	 Indeed,	 the	passage	 that	 I	 quote	here	 is	 not	faithful	to	the	manuscript,	which	I	follow.	
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And	 Kastil	 adds	 that	 such	 extrinsically	 individuated	 parts	 are	 “a	 special	 kind	 of	intermediate	 thing	 falling	 between	 the	 absurd	 universal	 things	 and	 the	 real	individual	things”.8		After	his	reistic	turn,	Brentano	rejects	the	existence	of	abstracta:	only	things	exist,	i.e.	concrete	particulars.	Redness	 as	 such,	 i.e.	 as	 abstract,	 does	not	 exist,	 but	 is	 a	mere	“fiction”;	 only	 something	 red	 exists	 (Brentano	 1933/1981a:	 6–7/17).	 Concrete	particulars	are	either	substances	or	accidents.	Accidents	are	not	abstract	parts,	but	concrete	wholes,	with	 a	 substance	 as	 a	 part	 (Brentano	 1933/1981a:	 11/19).	 They	are	individuated	by	their	substances.	Bodies	are	no	longer	substances,	but	qualitative	accidents,	 individuated	by	 the	spatiotemporally-localized,	 individual	 substance	 that	they	 contain.	 Souls	 are	 concrete,	 individual	 substances	 (see	 notably	 Brentano	1933/1981a:	 246–248/177–178	 and	 Kastil	 1933/1981:	 363–364	 n.	 1/253–254	 n.	297).9	What	about	individuation	of	accidents?	As	wholes,	Brentano’s	accidents	are	no	longer	 individuated	 “extrinsically”,	 but	 intrinsically,	 since	 their	 individuator,	 the	substance,	 is	 a	 part	 of	 them.	 However,	 they	 still	 have	 ontologically-distinct	qualitative	and	individuation	grounds:	a	non-substantial,	qualitative	portion10	and	an	individuating	substance.	Thus,	one	could	wonder	whether	these	qualitative	portions	as	such	are	individual.11			
																																																								8	This	 remark,	 in	Brentano	1933/1981a:	60–61/52–53,	 is	probably	Kastil’s	own,	 since	 it	 is	missing	in	the	manuscript	(ms.	M	70,	n°30837).		9	Since	Brentano,	in	his	Würzburgian	metaphysic	lectures,	rejects	the	existence	of	abstracta,	considering	 them	 simply	 “fictions”,	 his	 early	 position	 resembles	 his	 reistic	 theory	 (see	Chrudzimski	2004,	Baumgartner	2013:	236,	Kriegel	forthcoming:	1–2	n.	1).	10	Brentano	 strangely	 affirms	 that	 an	 accident	 is	 a	 whole	 having	 no	 other	 “part”	 than	 its	substance	 (see	 Chap.	 17).	 This	 said,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 (in	 one	 sense	 or	 another)	 ‘something	more’	 than	 the	 substance	 constitutes	 the	 accident.	 It	 is	 this	 ‘something	 more’	 that	 I	 call	“qualitative	portion”.	11	See	 also	 Simons	 1988:	 53–54	 about	 the	 “lack	 of	 individuality”	 of	 Brentano’s	 reistic	accidents,	as	well	as	Chrudzimski	2004:	188.	
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II.	Ontological	features	proper	to	relations		Brentano,	 before	 his	 reistic	 turn,	 distinguishes	 relations,	 relata,	 and	 relatives.	Relations	are	(allegedly)	abstract	particulars,	e.g.	this	fatherhood	and	this	childhood.	
Relata	 are	particular	bearers	of	 relations,	 e.g.	 Sophroniscus	and	Socrates.	Relatives	are	concrete	particulars	constituted	by	a	relation	and	a	relatum,	e.g.	 this	father	and	this	son.	It	has	been	argued	that	Brentano’s	relations	are	monadic	properties,	since	they	depend	on	Aristotle’s	 theory	of	relations	or	“pros	ti”,	which	would	be	monadic	properties	 (Chrudzimski	 2001:	 194,	 Sauer	 2006:	 22).	 However,	 it	 is	 not	 clear	 that	Aristotle’s	relations	are	monadic,	since,	at	least	in	the	standard	cases,	the	existence	of	a	 relative	 entails	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 correlative:	 if	 a	 relation	 exists,	 then	 its	 own	
relatum,	 a	 converse	 relation,	 and	 the	 relatum	 of	 the	 converse	 relation	 exist	 (see	Aristotle,	 Cat.	 VII,	 6b28–8a12	 and	 Hood	 2004:	 96).	 Moreover,	 for	 Brentano,	 the	logical	 form	 of	 relations	 seems	 not	 to	 be	 x(Ry),	 where	 (Ry)	 would	 be	 a	 monadic	predicate,	but	something	closer	to	the	polyadic	Russellian	logical	form	xRy:12		When	I	predicate	“bigger	than	A”	of	something,	I	do	not	predicate	A	of	it,	but	I	relate	it	to	A.	(Brentano	1966a:	205;	my	translation)		Besides,	one	finds	clear	affirmation	of	the	polyadic	dimension	of	relational	properties	in	Brentano’s	pre-reistic	texts:		[Relative	determinations]	depend,	for	their	individual	subsistence,	on	the	one	of	the	absolute	[determinations]	(certainly	also	on	the	[subsistence]	of	another	thing	than	the	one	to	which	they	are	ascribed),	but	 the	 latter	do	not	 inversely	[depend	on	the	former].	 (Brentano	1992–1993:	258–259;	my	 translation,	and	my	additions,	except	for	“subsistence”)		For	Brentano,	before	 reism,	 relatives	are	ontologically	and	conceptually	dependent	on	 one	 another.	 A	 relation	 can	 only	 exist	 and	 be	 thought	 with	 its	 own	 relatum,	 a	converse	relation,	and	the	relatum	of	the	converse	relation	(Brentano	2013a/c:	435–436/469–470).	 Thus,	 unlike	 philosophers	who	 consider	 converse	 relations	 to	 be	 a	matter	 of	mere	 “linguistic	 presentation”	 (Massin	 2009:	 580,	Williamson	 1985;	 see	also	Fine	2000),	Brentano	takes	them	seriously	both	conceptually	and	ontologically.		Following	 a	 medieval	 distinction,	 Brentano	 considers	 some	 relations	 to	 be	 real	(relationes	reales),	whereas	others	are	unreal	(relationes	rationis).13	A	relation	is	real	when	 its	 corresponding	 relative	 begins	 or	 ceases	 to	 exist	 by	 having	 itself	 been																																																									12	On	Russell’s	criticism	of	the	logical	form	of	“monadistic”	relational	predicates	like	(Ry),	see	Russell	1903:	§	214.	13	On	 the	 medieval	 distinction	 between	 “real	 relations”	 and	 “relations	 of	 reason”,	 see	Henninger	1989.	
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“causally	 brought	 about”	 or	 having	 itself	 undergone	 “a	 [destructive]	 influence	 or	removal	 of	 a	 sustaining	 influence”,	 whereas	 a	 relation	 is	 unreal	 when	 its	corresponding	 relative	 begins	 or	 ceases	 to	 exist	 because	 something	 else	 has	 been	generated	 or	 destroyed	 (Brentano	 2013a/c:	 466–467/432–433).	 For	 example,	regarding	“relations	of	comparison”,	‘something	larger’	or	‘something	smaller’	begin	or	cease	to	exist	not	by	themselves	undergoing	a	causal	influence,	but	because	their	own	 height	 or	 the	 height	 of	 their	 correlative	 has	 undergone	 such	 influence.	 Thus,	both	relations	are	unreal.	Regarding	“causal	relations”,	‘something	caused’	obviously	begins	to	exist	by	undergoing	a	causal	effect	 itself,	which	 is	clearly	not	 the	case	 for	‘something	 causing’.	 When	 an	 active	 thing	 brings	 about	 ‘something	 caused’,	 for	example	 when	 the	 sun	 heats	 a	 stone,	 it	 becomes	 ‘something	 causing’	 en	 passant.	Thus,	 the	 effect	 is	 really	 related	 to	 the	 cause,	 but	 not	 the	 cause	 to	 the	 effect.	Regarding	the	 intentional	relation,	 the	thinking-thing	 is	a	real	relative,	whereas	the	thought-thing	is	an	unreal	relative.	Indeed,	the	thought-thing	is	generated	when	the	mental	 act	 is	 generated	and	disappears	when	 the	mental	 act	disappears	 (Brentano	2013a/c:	 470–471/436–437,	 1982/1995b:	 21/23–24).	 There	 is	 a	major	 difference	between	 these	 three	 examples	 of	 correlations:	 unreal	 relatives	 of	 comparison	 and	unreal	 causal	 relatives	 have	 a	 real	 relatum	as	 a	 part	 (two	 things	with	 quantitative	features	for	the	relations	of	comparison,	an	active	thing	for	the	relation	of	the	cause	to	 the	effect);	 in	 the	case	of	 the	 intentional	 correlation,	 the	unreal	 correlate	has	an	unreal	relatum	as	a	part,	i.e.	the	thought-thing,	as	an	“immanent	object”,	depends	on	the	act	with	respect	to	all	its	parts	(see	Chap.	4).		After	his	reistic	turn,	Brentano	will	abandon	irrealia	and,	thus,	unreal	relatives.	As	a	consequence,	 his	 correlations	 will	 be	 ontologically	 impoverished.	 In	 some	 cases,	there	is	just	one	relative	left,	but	with	a	relatum	in	front	of	it,	e.g.	causality:	there	is	an	effect	left,	i.e.	a	real	relative	containing	a	real	relatum,	and	an	active	thing,	i.e.	a	real	
relatum	(Brentano	1976/1988:	125–126/75).	 In	 some	cases,	 there	 is	 all	 in	 all	 only	one	 relative	 left,	 e.g.	 intentionality:	 there	 is	 just	 the	 thinking	 subject	 left,	 a	 real	relative	 containing	 a	 real	 relatum.	 Brentano	will	 nevertheless	 remain	 a	 “realist”	 of	relatives:	 indeed,	 relatives	 of	 comparison	 ontologically	 “coincide”	 with	 their	underlying	 absolute	 features,	 but	 this	 does	 not	 hold	 for	 other	 relatives,	 e.g.	intentional	 or	 causal	 ones,	 which	 are	 ontologically	 irreducible	 (Brentano	1933/1981a:	 258–259/184–185,	 1966a:	 310–311).	 Initially,	 Brentano	 said	 that	relatives	without	 a	 term	 (i.e.	without	 even	 a	 relatum	 in	 front	 of	 them)	 are	merely	conceptually	 relative.	 The	 direct	 (or	 “in	 recto”)	 presentation	 of	 a	 thinking	 subject	entails	 the	 concomitant	 indirect	 (or	 “in	obliquo”)	presentation	of	 the	object	 toward	which	 the	 subject	 is	 directed.	 Yet,	 from	 an	 ontological	 point	 of	 view,	 the	 thinking	subject	is	not	a	relative	proper,	but	something	“relative-like”	(Brentano	1911/1973a:	Appendix	I).	However,	Brentano	changes	his	mind	on	this	point	around	1915–1916	and	 argues	 “isolated”	 relatives	 are	 genuine	 relatives:	 the	 thinking	 subject	 is	genuinely	 relative	 even	when	 its	object	 is	 impossible;	 the	 “aftereffect”	 is	 genuinely	
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relative	even	when	its	cause	has	disappeared	(Brentano	1933/1981a:	237–238/171;	see	 Gilson	 1955:	 138–154,	 Sauer	 2006:	 21–24,	 Taieb	 forthcoming).	 Thus,	 in	 non-reistic,	abstract	terms,	Brentano	admits	in	his	ontology	what	Grossmann	(1969:	31–32)	calls	“abnormal	relations”,	i.e.	relations	without	an	existent	term.	Certainly	this	is	an	 abnormal	 thesis,	 and	 Brentano’s	 death	 in	 1917	 unfortunately	 deprived	 it	 of	 an	extensive	justification.		 	
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